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Abstract 
 
We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978-
1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court 
system, and industry sources.  The probability of being involved in a suit is 
heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by 
individuals and smaller firms.  Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of 
expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors.  Patentees with a large 
portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage 
“cooperative” interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions.  At 
the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics.  
This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive 
legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources.  But it is bad news in that 
the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a 
more rapid resolution of their suits.  However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in 
litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this 
adverse effect of high enforcement costs. 
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1 Introduction
Patent litigation grew rapidly during the period 1978-1999. The number of patent suits
rose by almost tenfold, with much of this increase occurring during the 1990's. This
has raised fears among scholars and the business community that \patent thickets" are
beginning to impede the ability of ¯rms to conduct R&D activity e®ectively (Eisenberg,
1999; Shapiro, 2001). But focusing on the level of litigation is misleading. We show
that the the growth in patenting has been comparable to the growth in litigation, with
the consequence that ¯ling rates for suits have been roughly constant over these two
decades. The average rate is relatively low, 19.0 suits per thousand patents. But this
too is misleading, because exposure to litigation varies widely across technology ¯elds and
patent pro¯les. Average suit rates vary from a low of 11.8 per thousand chemical patents
to 25-35 per thousand computer, biotechnology and non-drug health patents. Moreover,
within any given technology ¯eld, probabilities of litigation di®er very substantially, and
are systematically related to patent characteristics associated with their economic value
and to characteristics of their owners.
This heterogeneity of patents, and their owners, is a central issue for the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights and its economic consequences. Lerner (1995), for
example, provides evidence that small ¯rms avoid R&D areas where the threat of lit-
igation from larger ¯rms is high. Lanjouw and Lerner (2002) argue that the use of
preliminary injunctions by large ¯rms can discourage R&D by small ¯rms, and this may
apply to other legal mechanisms. Even if parties can settle their patent disputes with-
out resorting to suits, the e®ective threat of litigation will in°uence settlement terms
and thus, ultimately, the incentives to undertake R&D. The essence of the process of
enforcing patent rights is sorting, or selection, among patent disputes. In theoretical
models of litigation (P'ng, 1983; Bebchuk, 1984; Priest and Klein, 1984; Spier, 1992),
this sorting can occur at each stage of the legal process, beginning with the decision to
¯le a suit and ending either with post-suit settlement or adjudication at trial. Using a
comprehensive new data set covering all recorded patent litigation in the U.S. over the
period 1978-1999, we analyse the determinants of this sorting process.
One of our key empirical ¯ndings is that virtually all of the sorting on observed
characteristics of both patents and their owners occurs in the decision to ¯le suits. The
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key post-suit outcomes { the probability of settlement and the plainti® win rates at
trial { are almost completely independent of these characteristics. The threat of court
action (suits) is the primary mechanism through which sorting occurs, and this helps
to mitigate the private (and social) costs of enforcement. This conclusion is reinforced
by two additional ¯ndings: ¯rst, post-suit settlement rates are high (about 95 percent)
and, second, most settlement occurs soon after the suit is ¯led, often before the pre-trial
hearing is held.
There are two main mechanisms by which patentees can settle disputes without
resorting to litigation. The ¯rst is by \trading" intellectual property. This take vari-
ous forms, including cross-licensing agreements and patent exchanges, sometimes with
balancing cash payments (Grindley and Teece, 1997). One motivation for accumulating
patents may be to facilitate such trading (Hall and Zeidonis, 2001). The second mech-
anism that promotes settlement of disputes is the expectation of repeated interaction
among patentees. The theory of supergames, especially under incomplete information,
suggests that repeated interaction increases both the ability (players learn about each
other's unobserved type) and the incentive to settle disputes \cooperatively"{ i.e., with-
out ¯ling suits (see, for example, Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). But there is very little
econometric evidence to support this prediction.2
The importance of trading and repeated interaction as mechanisms for patent dis-
pute resolution is supported by three key ¯ndings in this paper. First, we ¯nd strong
evidence of a patent portfolio e®ect in enforcing patent rights: having a larger portfolio
of patents reduces the probability of ¯ling a suit on any individual patent, conditional
on its observed characteristics. And the quantitative e®ect is large. For a (small) do-
mestic unlisted company with a small portfolio of 100 patents, the average probability
of litigating a given patent is two percent. For a similar company but with a moderate
portfolio of 500 patents, the ¯gure drops to only 0.5 percent. This portfolio e®ect means
that there are bene¯cial \enforcement spillovers" across patents within a given ¯rm,
conferring advantages to size in the ability of ¯rms to appropriate returns from their
intellectual property. Second, we ¯nd that the (marginal) e®ect of patent portfolio size
is stronger for smaller companies, as measured by employment. For small ¯rms, having
a portfolio of patents to \trade" is likely to be the key mechanism for avoiding litigation,
whereas larger ¯rms can also rely on repeated interaction in intellectual property and
2A notable exception is Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) who construct measures of repeat play and
¯nd evidence that reputation matters in various areas of litigation.
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product markets to discipline behaviour. Third, ¯rms which operate in technology ar-
eas that are more concentrated (where patenting is dominated by fewer companies) are
much less likely to be involved in patent infringement suits. In short, what is important
for settlement is that ¯rms either have a portfolio of intellectual property to trade, or
have other dimensions of interaction that promote \cooperative" behavior. In addition
to the ability to trade patents and repeated play, we ¯nd that asymmetry of ¯rm size
a®ects litigation risk. Patent owners who are large relative to disputants they are likely
to encounter less frequently resort to the courts to settle disputes.
We also show the characteristics of a given patent strongly a®ect litigation risk in
ways that are consistent with existing hypotheses in the economics literature (as in Lan-
jouw and Schankerman, 2001). We illustrate this with two example. First, more valuable
patents, as measured by the number of claims and citations per claim, are much more
likely to be involved in suits. Second, patents that are related to subsequent technological
activity by the ¯rm (cumulative innovation), as measured by the extent of self-citation
in patents, are more likely to be litigated. This supports the idea that complementar-
ity among inventions increases the willingness to protect the property rights, especially
the key (early) innovations in the chain (Scotchmer, 1991). We show that di®erences
in these, and other, patent characteristics lead to wide variations in the probability of
litigation, within any given technology ¯eld.
Both the advantages of patent portfolio and company size in settling disputes, and
the heterogeneity of litigation risk across patents, point to the potential importance of
developing market-based provision of patent litigation insurance. This may be essential
for strengthening the ability of small ¯rms to enforce their intellectual property rights,
and their bargaining power in negotiated settlements. There are a number of providers
of litigation insurance in the U.S. and other countries. But the e®ective demand has
been severely limited by high prices while, at the same time, pro¯tability for suppliers
is undermined by the widespread use of pooled prices. Some of these concerns have
recently been voiced in government and the public media.3 The results in this paper can
be used to develop insurance pricing schemes that recognise the (observed) heterogeneity
of litigation risk. From the perspective of small ¯rms, this is a double-edged sword. By
facilitating economically rational price di®erentiation, such information may make it
3For an interesting policy discussion of past experience in this area, see the Danish Ministry of Trade
and Industry (2001) report. A recent media story appeared in the U.K. Financial Times (September
14, 2001).
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easier to establish sustainable insurance markets. On the other hand, the advantages to
portfolio and company size in reducing litigation risk suggest that the appropriate prices
for smaller ¯rms should be higher than for large ¯rms, for any given patent pro¯le. But
both small and large ¯rms have patents of many pro¯les, and di®erentiating pricing
across patent characteristics is likely to be bene¯cial to both types of ¯rms.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the analytical framework,
including the litigation stages and outcomes we analyse. Section 3 describes the con-
struction of the data set, summarises the main characteristics of patents and their owners
on which we focus, and discusses how they relate to economic hypotheses about the de-
terminants of litigation. Section 4 presents and discusses non-parametric evidence on
the relationship between these characteristics and the ¯ling of suits and their outcomes.
Section 5 presents econometric analysis of the determinants of litigation for infringe-
ment and invalidity suits, and of post-suit settlement. Concluding remarks summarise
directions for future research.
2 Analytical Framework
For analytical purposes, we break down the litigation process into four stages: 1. ¯ling
the suit, 2. the pre-trial hearing, 3. commencement of the trial, and 4. adjudication at
the conclusion of trial. According to our discussions with patent lawyers, legal costs are
more closely related to how many stages the case reaches than to the actual length of the
case, which is strongly a®ected by the availability of court resources and other external
factors.
There are three possible outcomes to a suit: 1. settlement, 2. win for the plainti®,
or 3. win for the defendant (the identity of the patentee depends on whether it is an
infringement or invalidity suit).4 If a patent dispute is settled before a suit is ¯led, we
do not observe the dispute in the data. Thus low ¯ling rates can either re°ect low rates
infringement (disputes) or high probability of pre-suit settlement. After a suit is ¯led,
settlement can occur before the pre-trial hearing, after the hearing but before the trial
begins, or during the trial. Otherwise, the trial concludes with a court judgement in
4A win for both parties can arise, e.g., infringement suits when there is a counter-claim for invalidity
by the defendant. The court may rule that infringement occurred but strike down the validity of some
of the patent claims. When a win for both parties is recorded, we count it both for the plainti® and the
defendant rather than as a separate category.
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favour of one of the parties.5.
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) analysed the determinants of the probability of
litigation (case ¯lings). For this paper we have constructed a larger data set that allows
us to study both case ¯lings and post-suit outcomes. In particular, we analyse:
1. the probability of a suit being ¯led
2. the probability of settlement, conditional on a suit being ¯led
3. the timing of settlement: i.e., the conditional probability that the suit is resolved
before the pre-trial hearing or after.
4. the planti® win rates, conditional on adjudication at trial.
Information on win rates is relevant for assessing overall litigation risk (e.g., in
pricing patent insurance). Such information is also useful in testing competing economic
models of litigation because the models generate di®erent predictions about plainti® win
rates at trial (Walfogel, 1998; Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999). There are two main
models: divergent expectations (Priest and Klein, 1984) and asymmetric information
(Bebchuk, 1984). In the divergent expectations model, each party estimates the quality
of his case (equivalently, the relevant legal standard) with error, and cases go to trial
when the plainti® is su±ciently more optimistic than the defendant. This is most likely
to occur when true case quality is near the court's decision standard. This selection
mechanism drives the plainti® win rate at trial toward 50 percent.6 In the asymmetric
information model, one party knows the probability that the plainti® will win at trial,
while the other party knows only the distribution of plainti® win rates. The uniformed
party makes a settlement o®er (or a sequence of o®ers, in dynamic versions of the model -
Spier 1992) and it will be accepted only by informed defendants who face a relatively low
probability of winning at trial. Trials can arise in equilibrium because settlement o®ers
have some probability of failing when one of the parties has private information. Because
of this one-sided selection mechanism, the asymmetric information model predicts that
the win rate for the party with private information should tend toward 100 percent. As
we discuss in Section 4, the empirical evidence for patent litigation strongly favors the
5Apart from settlement, the court may dismiss the case prior to trial without request of one of the
parties. We drop these cases from the sample. In this paper we do not distinguish di®erent forms of
adjudication, such as court verdicts, jury verdicts and directed verdicts.
6If parties have di®erential stakes (e.g., one ¯rm also gets reputation gains from winning), the diver-
gent expectations model predicts higher win rates for the party with higher stakes.
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divergent expectations model.
Litigation models explain why cases reaching trial are a selected sample of ¯led
cases. Similar selection will be at work on ¯led cases, to the extent that potential
plainti®s may not ¯le suits on certain types of patents (or defendants may settle prior to
suit). Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) show that observed characteristics of patents
and their owners strongly a®ect the probability of ¯ling a suit. We con¯rm, and extend,
those ¯ndings in this paper. At the same time, we ¯nd that post-suit outcomes { e.g.,
whether parties settle, or who wins if the case reaches trial { are unrelated to these same
characteristics.
3 Description of Data
The data source used to identify litigated patents is the LitAlert database produced
by Derwent, a private vendor. This database is primarily constructed from information
collected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark O±ce (PTO). The data used include 13,625
patent cases ¯led during the period 1978-1999. Each case ¯ling identi¯es the main patent
in dispute, although there may also be other patents listed. We use only the main listed
patent in our analysis, for reasons explained later. There are 9,345 patents involved in
our sample of suits.
We also obtained information on all U.S. patent-related cases (those coded 830)
from the court database organised by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). This informa-
tion runs through the end of 1997 and includes the progress or resolution of suits { e.g.,
whether the case is settled and at which stage of the proceedings this occurs, whether
the case proceeds to trial, and the outcome of the trial.7 The form of docket numbering
was made (by hand) consistent across the two data sets, so they could be merged.
To create a control group, we generated a \matched" set of patents from the
population of all U.S. patents (both litigated and unlitigated) from the PTO. For each
litigated patent, a patent was chosen at random from the set of all U.S. patents with
the same application year and primary 3-digit U.S. Patent Classi¯cation (USPC) class
assignment. By constructing the population sample in this way, the comparisons we
7Discussions with the Federal Judicial Center indicated the data probably do not cover all cases
involving patents, as some may be coded under other categories by the court (e.g., the patent issue may
be part of a broader contractual dispute). This is also evident in the data where a small percentage of
cases identi¯ed in Derwent are not in the FJC database (see Somaya, 2001, for a breakdown between
typos and coding di®erences). But there is no reason to expect any selection bias from the perspective
of the issues we analyse.
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present between litigated patents and matched patents largely control for technology
and cohort e®ects. The control is not perfect, however, because we have 12,771 matched
patents. This is bigger than the number of litigated patents for two reasons. First,
the more recent part of our sample includes matches for both main and other patents
in each suit, whereas we only use the main litigated patents in the analysis. Second,
in combining our old (1978-91) and new (1990-99) data, we dropped duplicate cases in
the overlapping years when counting litigated patents. We do not have identi¯ers in
either round of subsetting the litigated data that would allow us to easily delete the
corresponding matched patents. We do not expect this to create any systematic bias.
Although the U.S. Federal courts are required to report to the PTO every case
¯ling that involves a U.S. patent, under-reporting occurs in practice. Thus the PTO
(and Derwent) data is a subset of all patent cases. To estimate the reporting rates, we
take the number of cases ¯led according to Derwent divided by the number in the same
year that are coded as a patent case by the Federal Judicial Center. We can compute
the reporting rates through 1998 (we use the last value for 1999). They stabilise in the
1990's at about 55 percent (see Appendix 1). We found no evidence of selection bias in
the underreporting by the courts to the PTO: there are no signi¯cant di®erences between
reported and unreported cases for a range of variables in the federal database.
A truncation issue arises because we observe suit ¯lings only through 1999, so
later cohorts of patents look like they are less litigated by construction. We use the lag
structure for case ¯lings for cohorts 1982-86 to adjust for this truncation. The estimates
are based on the pooled sample, and are applied to each technology ¯eld. The truncation
rate for the 1992 cohort (i.e., lag of 7 years) is about 50 pecent, and it jumps sharply to
75 percent for the 1995 cohort. Appendix 1 presents the estimated truncation rates.
From the main PTO database we obtained information on the following character-
istics for each litigated and matched patent:
Number of Claims: A patent is comprised of a set of claims which delineates the
boundaries of the property rights provided by the patent. The principal claims de¯ne
the essential novel features of the invention in their broadest form and the subordinate
claims are more restricted and may describe detailed features of the innovation claimed.
The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in the application, but the
patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed before granting.
Technology Field : Each patent is assigned by the patent examiner to 3-digit classes
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of the USPC system, of which there are 421 in total. The USPC is a heirarchical,
technology-based classi¯cation system and patents may be assigned to more than one
class. In the empirical analysis, we use the set of all 3-digit classes to which a patent was
assigned. We use the categorisation developed by Adam Ja®e to aggregate these classes
to a 2-digit level (used for some purposes explained later) and then to the eight broad
technology groups used in most of the paper: Drugs, Other Health, Chemical, Elec-
tronics (excl. computers), Mechanical, Computers, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous.
Assignments to biotechnology are based on the categorisation used by the PTO when
determining who examines a patent. The technology ¯eld composition of cases is given
in Table 1.
Citations: An inventor must cite all related prior U.S. patents in the patent ap-
plication. A patent examiner who is an expert in the ¯eld is responsible for insuring
that all appropriate patents have been cited. Like claims, the citations in the patent
document help to de¯ne the property rights of the patentee. For each patent in the
litigated and matched data, we obtained the number of prior patents cited in the ap-
plication (backward citations) and their USPC sub-class assignments. We obtained the
same information on all subsequent patents which had cited a given patent in their
own applications, as of 1998 (forward citations). For recent patents there is substantial
truncation in the number of forward citations, since citation lags can be long (Ja®e and
Trajtenberg, 1999). To minimise truncation bias, we limit parts of the analysis to cohorts
before 1993. For older patents there is considerable missing information on the USPC
sub-class assignments of backward citations, as comprehensive data are only available
from about 1970, but the number of backward citations is complete for all patents.
Ownership: We identify each patent owner as an individual, an unlisted company,
or a listed company.8 Individual and ¯rm owners are indicated as such in the PTO
data. Bronwyn Hall and Adam Ja®e were generous in providing us with their link
between PTO company codes and Standard and Poors' CUSIP identication code, based
on the 1989 industry structure. We call a patent-owning company \listed" if we are
able to identify it as having a Standard and Poor's CUSIP code at that time.9 Unlisted
8A small share of patents is assigned to institutions, such as universities, hospitals or governments.
We treat these as unlisted companies.
9Two points are worth noting here. First, companies that merge after 1989 stop accumulating patent
portfolios because their subsequent patenting is listed under a di®erent (merged company) code. Second,
8
companies are typically smaller than listed ones, but there is wide variation in both
categories. Individuals and listed companies are more predominantly domestic (81.0 and
95.6 percent, respectively) than unlisted companies (60.4 percent). We also break down
listed ¯rms into \large" ¯rms (those with employment above the median of 5425) and
\small" ¯rms with employment below the median. Unless otherwise noted, we classify
the nearly 40 percent of ¯rms without employment data as large ¯rms because they have
similar litigation and settlement patterns.
Nationality : We use the PTO designation of companies as domestic or foreign if
there is an assignee, and the address of the ¯rst listed inventor if there is no assignee.
Domestic patents account for 73.4 percent of the total.
Case Type: We manually matched the owner of each litigated patent to the ap-
propriate party in the suit (plainti®, defendant, neither). We identify a ¯led case as
an infringement suit if the patent owner is a plainti®, and as a suit for a declaratory
judgment if the patent owner is a defendant. This could be done for about 65 percent of
the suits. For those cases, infringement suits account for about 85 percent of the total.
In most of the analysis we treat those suits where the patentee is not one of the litigants
as an infringement suit, since they are likely to be suits brought either by an exclusive
licensee or by a subsidiary or head o±ce of the patent-owning entity.
Patent Portfolio Size: Each company that is assigned a patent by the inventor is
given a company code by the PTO. This allows us to construct a measure of the size
of an owner's patent portfolio, as it looks around the application date of each of our
sample patents. The relevant portfolio variable (portsize) is de¯ned as the number of
patents owned by a company that have an application date within ten years in either
direction of the patent in question. Notice that this portfolio size variable may di®er
across patents, for a given company. As expected, domestic listed companies tend to
have larger portfolios { roughly a third of patents owned by domestic listed companies
are in portfolios in each of size groups 1-100, 100-900 and >900 patents. By contrast,
about 90 percent of patents owned by domestic unlisted companies, and two-thirds of
patents owned by foreign companies, are in portfolios with fewer than 100 patents.
Technology Concentration: We construct a measure of ¯rm concentration in the
any listed company that is started after 1989 will not have a CUSIP in our data and thus will be coded
as an unlisted company.
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technology area of each patent. To do this, we ¯rst construct, for each 2-digit USPC
class, a four-¯rm concentration index, measured as the patenting share of the top four
¯rms. A ¯rm's share is the size of its patent portfolio in that class divided by the sum
of all ¯rms' patents in that class. For each patent we then construct a weighted average
of the concentration indices for the di®erent classes, where the weights are the shares of
the forward citations to the patent that fall in that technology class. Formally, let Zcf
be the portfolio size for ¯rm f in technology class c (including all patents since 1978)
and Zc: =
P
f Z
c
f : The concentration index for the class is C4
c =
P
f Z
c
f=Z
c
: ; where the
sum is over the top four ¯rms in terms of shares in that class. The weighted technology
concentration index for patent i is C4i =
P
cw
c
iC4
c where wci = F
c
i =F
:
i is the fraction of
the forward citations to patent i that fall into technology class c: If a company operates
in more concentrated technological areas, it faces a greater chance of encountering other
¯rms in patent disputes more than once. This expectation of repeated interaction should
lower the litigation rate (i.e., promote pre-suit settlement).
Relative Size: We construct a measure of the asymmetry in portfolio size between
a patentee and the \representative" disputant he can expect to face on each patent.
Relative portfolio size is de¯ned as the ¯rm's total portfolio size (including all patents
since 1978) divided by a weighted average of the portfolio size of ¯rms in classes from
which its forward citations come. Formally, let Z :f =
P
c Z
c
f be the portfolio size for
¯rm f; and Z
c
: = Z
c
: =nc be the average portfolio size of the nc ¯rms with patents in class
c: The relative portfolio size of ¯rm f for patent i is Rif = Z
:
f=
P
cw
c
iZ
c
: ; :where w
c
i is
de¯ned as above.
For a patentee who is the plainti® (infringement suits), being relatively large confers
greater threat power (e.g., holding cross-licensing of other patents hostage to this dispute)
and this should facilitate settlement with the infringer. This is less clear-cut when the
patentee is the defendant. A stronger defendant may be less willing to settle (or be
able to extract more favorable settlement terms from the plainti®). Thus we expect
the probability of litigation to decline with relative size in infringement suits, but the
prediction for declaratory judgement suits is ambiguous.
Other Information: From Standard and Poors' information on listed companies,
we downloaded ¯nancial and other company information for the listed ¯rms either owning
patents involved in litigation or in our matched sample.
The preceding variables are designed to capture the main determinants of patent
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suits:10 (i) the number of potential disputes - measured by the number of claims, the
diversity of technology classes into which the patent falls, and the technological similarity
of future patents that cite the original one; (ii) the size of the stakes - measured by the
number of future citations the patent receives, and the extent of self-citation (as an
indicator of the ¯rm's cumulative investment in that technology); and (iii) the relative
costs of settlement and prosecuting a suit - measured by patent portfolio size, technology
concentration, relative size, and ownership type and nationality of the patentee.
4 Non-parametric Evidence
Although the number of patent infringement suits has risen by almost tenfold since 1978,
the increase has not been uniform across technology ¯elds { it was particularly high in
Drugs, Biotechnology, Computers and Other Electronics. Closer examination of the
data shows that the increase in the aggregate number of suits has been driven both
by the sharp increases in the number of patent applications in each technology ¯eld
and by the shift of patenting toward technology ¯elds with higher litigation rates. The
total number of patent applications grew by 71 percent over the period, but in Drugs,
Biotechnology, and Medical Instruments patenting nearly tripled, and in Computers it
grew by four-fold. Once the growth in patenting is taken into account, we ¯nd that there
has been no trend increase in the ¯ling rates of suits in any technology ¯eld over this
period.
Table 2 presents estimates of average ¯ling rates for three sub-periods: 1978-84,
1985-90 and 1991-95. We measure ¯ling rates as the number of suits ¯led per thousand
patents from a given cohort.11 These include all of the suits ¯led in connection with these
patents through 1999 (i.e., we count multiple cases for the same patent), and they are
adjusted both for under-reporting in the Derwent data and truncation associated with
time lags in case ¯lings.12
10For a good, general discussion of the economic determinants of litigation, see Cooter and Rubinfeld
(1989).
11We do not compute rates based on ¯ling year for two reasons: 1. the population of patents alive
at any date (the denominator of the ¯ling rate) is unknown since it depends on the pattern of patent
renewals for the preceding twenty cohorts, and 2. the age structure of the population changes over time
as patenting rates increase, and age and ¯ling rates are related.
12Given the acceleration of patenting activity, the stock of patents grew more slowly than the °ow
during this period, so that the number of ¯led cases relative to the stock of patents did rise (not
11
The table also shows that mean ¯ling rates vary substantially across technology
¯elds. A formal test that the ¯ling rates are the same across ¯elds is strongly rejected
(Â2(7) = 1; 103; p-value <.001). For the aggregate (pooled technology ¯eld) data, there
are 19.0 case ¯lings per thousand patents. The lowest rates are found in Chemicals (11.8),
Electronics (15.4) and Mechanical (16.9). Interestingly, ¯ling rates for pharmaceutical
patents are only modestly higher than the average. The ¯ling rates are much higher for
patents in Other Health, Computers, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous.
While we observe little evidence of trends in ¯ling rates, the level of ¯ling rates may
be understated by Table 2. They are caculated using only the main patents in each suit,
while there may in fact be several patents per suit. We present these calculations because,
for ¯ling years before 1990, we only have information about the main patents (mixing
the subsidiary patents for later years would distort litigation trends). The ¯ling rates we
compute are underestimates of the \true" rates if one views being a subsidiary patent
in a case as equivalent to being the main litigated patent. To estimate the di®erence,
one could scale up the ¯ling rate by dividing by the ratio of subsidiary to main patents.
This ratio is 0.24 percent overall, but it varies across technology ¯elds.13
It is important to look beyond average ¯ling rates for given technology ¯elds,
because they conceal huge heterogeneity. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) showed
that litigated patents have more claims and more forward citations per claim. Table
3 con¯rms this ¯nding on the larger data set. The table presents the mean number
of claims, and citations per claim, for litigated and matched patents, broken down by
ownership type. Litigated patents have far more claims than matched patents, and this
holds for each ownership type. They also have more forward citations per claim and
fewer backward cites per claim (i.e., the latter is an indication that the technology area
is well-developed and the innovation is more likely to be derivative and less valuable).
Both of these ¯ndings indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be involved in
litigation.
There are also large di®erences across di®erent types of patent owners. Table 4
summarizes the mean ¯ling and settlement rates for four ownership categories: individ-
uals, domestic unlisted and listed companies, and foreign companies. Domestic listed
companies are far less likely to ¯le suits on their patents than unlisted companies and
reported).
13The percentages for the individual technology ¯elds are: Drugs 0.25, Other Health 0.36, Chemicals
0.20, Electronics 0.37, Mechanical 0.20, Computers 0.34, Biotechnology 0.46, and Miscellaneous 0.15.
12
individuals: their mean ¯ling rate is 10.4 suits per thousand patents, as compared to
35- 45 suits for the smaller owners. Moreover, ¯ling rates for foreign patentees (mostly
unlisted ¯rms) are much lower than for their domestic counterparts. These di®erences
in mean ¯ling rates are statistically signi¯cant, and the joint null hypothesis that they
are the same is decisively rejected (Â2(3) = 11; 853; p-value <.001).
Although ¯ling rates di®er sharply across ownership types, we ¯nd that ownership
does not a®ect the probability that a suit is settled before it reaches the end of trial
{ which we call post-suit settlement. The formal Â2(3) test statistic is 4.55 (p-value ¼
0.2). Overall, about 95 percent of all patent suits ¯led are settled by the parties before
the conclusion of trial (and most of those before the trial begins). But the systematic
sorting on the ownership dimension occurs before suits are ¯led, not afterwards.
One explanation for why listed and unlisted ¯rms have such di®erent ¯ling rates
may be that the listed ¯rms are typically larger and there may be advantages to size.
As discussed above, there are two distinct aspects to such advantages. First, ¯rms with
larger patent portfolios may be better able to settle disputes through trading intellectual
property, without resorting to suits (the portfolio size e®ect). Second, if imperfect capital
markets constrain the ability of smaller ¯rms to ¯nance litigation, relatively large ¯rms
may be better able to settle because they pose greater litigation threats when confronting
smaller ¯rms. And when large ¯rms have disputes with each other, they are likely
to have many points of interaction other than trading intellectual property, especially
through competition in product markets. This expectation of repeated interaction in
other dimensions should promote settlement. We call these latter two aspects ¯rm size
e®ects. The detailed patent data will enable us to discriminate between the portfolio
size and each ¯rm size e®ect on litigation.
We begin by examining how the probability of litigation (i.e., of being involved in
at least one suit over the life of the patent) and the probability of post-suit settlement
varies with di®erent portfolio sizes. To compute these probabilities, we adjust for the
fact that patents from large portfolios are disproportionately represented in the matched
data (since the matching was not strati¯ed by portfolio size { see Appendix 2 for details).
Table 5 shows that the probability of litigation sharply declines with portfolio size. A
formal test con¯rms this ¯nding (Â2(6) = 2; 610; p-value <.001). The probability of
¯ling a suit involving a patent in a portfolio with a small number of other patents (0-10)
is 1.7 percent, compared to about 0.5 percent for a patent in a portfolio with 100-300
other patents, and only 0.25 percent for those in large portfolios (> 900 patents). These
13
are large di®erences, and they show that having bigger portfolios confer substantial
advantages in settling patent disputes without ¯ling suits. But again, we observe only
small di®erences in the post-suit settlement rates across portfolio size. The di®erences
in point estimates are marginally statistically signi¯cant (Â2(6) = 14:2; p-value ¼0.05).
To distinguish between the advantages of portfolio size and ¯rm size, we divide
domestic listed ¯rms into two groups { those with employment around 1989 above the
median level of 5,463 (\large") and those below the median (\small").14 Panel A in
Table 6 presents the litigation probability broken down both by portfolio size and this
measure of company size. First, we see a fall in litigation probability with portfolio
size within each ownership type, at least in point estimate. However, it is by far more
precipious for domestic unlisted companies. For a patent owned by such a company and
in a portfolio of 0-10 other patents, the average probability of being involved in litigation
is 2.6 percent, while for patents in the same sized portfolio but owned by listed domestic
companies it is closer to one percent. At the same time, there is little evidence that size
- either in terms of public listing or employment - matters once more than about 100
patents are held. For any given portfolio size, foreign companies are much less likely to
¯le suits than other types of ¯rms. The relationship between probability of litigation
and portfolio size holds in each of the technology ¯elds (not reported).
Similar to the results in Table 2, the probability of litigation di®ers substantially
across technology areas, for any given ownership type. Here we also see, however, that
the pattern of di®erences across ¯elds depends on the type of owner (see Table 7).
One explanation for these di®erences in litigation probabilities is that ¯rms with
larger portfolios may have a higher propensity to patent their innovations, and thus
more often have patents that are not worth ¯ghting over. But the evidence contradicts
this hypothesis. Portfolio size is positively, and signi¯cantly, correlated with forward
citations and forward citations per claim { the correlation coe±cients are 0.10 and 0.06,
respectively (these are computed using the matched sample and cohorts 1978-1988 to
avoid spurious correlation due to both portfolio size and citations being truncated.) This
indicates that the link between litigation probability and portfolio size does actually
re°ect the advantages that large portfolios give to ¯rms in settling disputes.
But this is only half the story. Panel B in Table 6 presents the average probability
14Employment data are missing for 38 percent of our listed ¯rms, either because their 1989 CUSIP
does not match to a 2000 CUSIP or because their employment is not recorded. This group is not
included for this test.
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of settlement for di®erent portfolio sizes and ownership categories, conditional on a suit
being ¯led. Here we see that post-suit settlement rates do not vary signi¯cantly with
portfolio size, or with ownership type controlling for portfolio size.
In short, the likelihood of ¯ling a suit (i.e., of not settling beforehand) is much
higher for patents owned by individuals and unlisted companies, and for patentees with
smaller patent portfolios to trade. But these di®erences do not appear in post-suit
settlement rates. Thus, almost all of the sorting among disputes, on the basis of observed
characteristics of patents and patentees, occurs before suits are ¯led, not afterwards in
the courts.
To this point we have focused on the probability of litigation and of post-suit
settlement. We now turn to the timing of such settlements and the win rates for cases
that reach the trial adjudication stage. Table 8 summarises this information broken
down by ownership type { domestic listed, domestic unlisted, and foreign ¯rms, and
all individuals. About 80 percent of all suits that are ever settled (without third party
adjudication) are settled before a pre-trial hearing is held. This suggests that the ¯ling
of a suit sends a strong signal about the seriousness of the plainti® to use legal means,
and quickly triggers resolution before substantial legal costs are incurred.15 Nearly all of
the remaining settlement occurs before the trial commences. However, the table shows
that the timing of settlements di®ers little by ownership type.
The table also shows the trial win rates (for infringement suits). For domestic
listed and unlisted ¯rms, the win rates are very close to 50 percent, as predicted by the
divergent expectations model of litigation. They are sharply inconsistent with the win
rates of either zero or 100 percent predicted by the asymmetric information models. The
point estimate of the win rate for foreign corporate patentees is only 42.7 percent, but
the standard error is relatively large.
5 Econometric Analysis
In this section we present estimates of probit regressions on the determinants of the
probability of infringement suits and post-suit settlement for the pooled data. These en-
dogenous variables are related to the following regressors: the number of claims, forward
citations per claim, backward citations per claim, the percentage of backward and for-
15Pooling all cases, the median number of months that pass before settlement occurs are 8, 16, and 25
for those settling before pre-trial hearing, after a hearing but before trial, and after trial, respectively.
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ward citations which are self-citations as measures of cumulative technology, the number
of 3-digit USPC's as a measure of patent breadth, the size of the patent portfolio and
the relative size of the patent portfolio, the latter as a measure of asymmetry between
a patent owner and likely disputants, the technology concentration index, and owner-
ship dummy variables that distinguish between patentees who are foreign or domestic
individuals, unlisted or listed ¯rms. The e®ects of technology and cohort on litiga-
tion probabilities are largely controlled by the matching, but because the litigated and
matched data contain somewhat di®erent numbers of patents, we also include technology
group dummies.
We use the Derwent data as the basis for the sample, since it contains the link
to patent numbers, and then include only those cases that can also be linked into the
FJC database which contains the outcomes information. This procedure yields 6,538
litigated main patents. In analysing the determinants of the litigation probability (¯ling
of suits), we do not count multiple cases involving the same patent. We do this to avoid
undue in°uence by a few patentees suing many infringers in separate but related cases.
We include multiple cases in the econometric analysis of the suit outcomes for three
reasons: 1. this is appropriate if the purpose is to assess litigation risk for pricing patent
insurance, 2. it is unclear how one would choose the \representative" suit when there
are multiple cases, and 3. the sample size for outcomes (especially trials) is relatively
small even when we include multiple cases.
Panel A in Table 9 summarises the parameter estimates and the sample marginal
e®ect of each variable on the probability of litigation for a randomly drawn patent in the
matched sample (i.e., at matched sample means). This is done separately for patent
infringement and declaratory judgement suits. Since the sample litigation rate is close
to 40 percent by construction, we must multiply the reported marginal e®ects by a
conversion factor in order to obtain the marginal e®ects for a randomly drawn patent in
the population (the conversion factors are given at the bottom of Table 9; see Appendix
3 for computational details). The statistical signi¯cance of variables and the relative size
of their e®ects are preserved through this conversion, although magnitudes will depend
on the speci¯c population of interest. We focus the discussion on the results for patent
infringement cases. Since the pattern of results is similar for declaratory judgement suits
(Panel B), we do not discuss them in detail.
The probability of litigation increases with the number of claims and forward ci-
tations per claim, at a declining rate, and the e®ects are substantial. Evaluated at
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population means (litigation probability of 1.35 percent), a ten percent increase in the
number of claims (1.2 claims at the mean) implies an increase of 3.1 percent in the popu-
lation probability of litigation. It is noteworthy that the point estimate of the elasticity
of the litigation probability with respect to claims is considerably smaller than unity.
A unit elasticity is required to make it rational, on actuarial grounds, to price patent
litigation insurance on a per claim basis, which is the standard procedure in policies
currently available in the marketplace. We also ¯nd that a 10 percent increase in the
number of forward citations per claim raises the probability of an infringement suit by 1.8
percent. These ¯ndings con¯rm the importance of the value of a patent in determining
infringement suits. In related work on the determinants of re-examinations at the U.S.
PTO and opposition proceedings at the European Patent O±ce - both events suggesting
that the use of a patent is subject to dispute - Graham, et. al., (2001) and Harho® and
Reitzig (2000) ¯nd similar positive relationships.
The likelihood of an infringement suit falls with the number of backward citations
per claim (at a declining rate). At mean values, a ten percent increase in the number
of backward citations per claim reduces the litigation probability by 0.7 percent. While
the e®ect is small, this ¯nding is consistent with the view that backward citations are an
indication that the patent is in a relatively well-developed technology area (where many
related patents have been taken out) where uncertainties about property rights is less
likely to cause frequent patent disputes (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
We have also argued that forward self-citations to a patent (given its total number
of forward citations) indicates the presence of \cumulative innovation" by the patentee.
That is, the patent owner is engaged in subsequent inventions that build on this earlier
patent and that, as a result, he has a greater incentive to protect his property rights
in this area. This hypothesis is supported by the positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on
the variable FWDSELF, the percentage of citations which is self-citation. At the mean
(FWDSELF=0.065), increasing the percentage of forward self-cites by 10 percent would
raise the probability of an infringement suit by 0.4 percent (the estimate is propor-
tionately higher for larger values of self-citing). At the same time, we ¯nd that greater
backward self-citation (BWDSELF) signi¯cantly reduces the likelihood of litigation, but
the e®ect is again small at the mean: raising the percentage of backward self-cites by
ten percent lowers the litigation probability by about 0.25 percent. Greater backward
self-citation in a patent indicates that an invention builds more extensively on one's own
past research and is thus more likely to be a \derivative" invention. This evidence sup-
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ports the idea that there is complementarity among technologically-related inventions in
a ¯rm's R&D portfolio, and that this raises the willingness to protect the property rights
of the key, early inventions in the chain.
In our earlier work, we found that greater technological similarity of forward ci-
tations increased the probability of litigation.16 The similarity measure was used as an
index of whether the technology area was \crowded" and thus more likely to generate
potential disputes. However, we do not ¯nd any evidence of that link in the current,
expanded data set.
Lerner (1994) suggests that patents with uses in many technological areas { \broad"
patents { are more likely to be litigated because they face more potential infringers. Us-
ing the number of technology class assignments as a measure of patent breadth, he
con¯rmed the hypothesis on a sample of biotechnology patents. Using more compre-
hensive data for various technology ¯elds, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) found that
broader patents are less likely to be involved in suits, but the evidence was weak. We
test this hypothesis on our expanded and more recent data set, using the number of
3-digit USPC classes as the measure of breadth (NO3USPC). The estimated coe±cient
is similar to the earlier estimate by Lanjouw and Schankerman and highly signi¯cant.
A ten percent increase in NO3USPC (the mean number of technology ¯eld assignments
is 2.2) reduces the litigation probability by about 1.7 percent.17 This ¯nding suggests
that it is harder to detect infringements when the patented innovation is used in more
technology areas, and that this e®ect dominates any increase in the number of potential
infringers associated with greater patent breadth.
An important ¯nding is that the probability of litigation is negatively related to the
size of the patent portfolio, with an elasticity (at the mean) of -0.13. The marginal e®ect
of portfolio size declines with larger portfolios (positive quadratic term), but the point
estimate of the portfolio e®ect is negative over most of the sample range. This means
that having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of being involved in a
suit on any individual patent owned by the ¯rm { i.e., there are bene¯cial \enforcement
spillovers" across patents within a given ¯rm. We can compute by how much increasing
16Similarity measures whether subsequent citing patents fall in similar technology ¯elds as the patent
in question. It is calculated by ¯nding the percentage of 3-digit USPC assignments of each citing patent
that overlap with those of the patent itself, and averaging over all citing patents.
17The point estimates in the separate technology ¯elds (not reported) are negative and statistically
signi¯cant in ¯ve cases, negative but insigni¯cant in two, and positive but insigni¯cant in one.
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portfolio size reduces the litigation probability of any constituent patent. For example,
raising the portfolio from 100 to 500 patents lowers the litigation probability on an
\average" patent (with characteristics at their mean values) by 0.13 percentage points,
or about 10 percent of the mean probability. Going from a portfolio of 500 to 2500
reduces the probability by 0.21 percentage points, or by about 15 percent. Harho®
and Reitzig (2000) ¯nd that larger portfolios also tend to keep owners out of European
opposition proceedings.
The impact of portfolio size on the probability of litigation is smaller for drug
patents than for patents in other technology ¯elds. Estimation at the technology ¯eld
level (not reported) suggested this hypothesis (the other di®erences in the estimated
portfolio coe±cients across technology ¯elds were not statistically signi¯cant). To test
the hypothesis, we include a portfolio dummy variable for non-drug technology ¯elds
(PortNondrug). The estimated coe±cient is negative and large relative to the baseline
portfolio e®ect. Using the estimated coe±cients on Portsize and PortNondrug, we ¯nd
that the marginal e®ect of portfolio size on the litigation probability is nearly twice
as large for non-drug patents as compared to drug patents. This ¯nding is consistent
with the idea that trading intellectual property is especially important in areas where
innovation is \complex" in the sense that it may rely on multiple components or research
tools that may be patented by other ¯rms. This feature has been less important in
drugs. Somaya (2001) ¯nds a similar di®erence using a somewhat overlapping technology
de¯nitions and a related variable for portfolio size. He ¯nds that the size of a patentee's
portfolio has an insign¯cant e®ect on the litigation of patents for research medicine while
it has a negative e®ect for computer patents.
The portfolio e®ect captures the ability of ¯rms to trade patents as a means of
settling disputes. Smaller companies may have few alternative mechanisms to facilitate
settlement, so we expect portfolio size to be more important for smaller ¯rms. To test
this hypothesis, we include interaction e®ects between portfolio size and ownership type
(unlisted, small domestic and foreign listed, with large domestic listed ¯rms the left out
category). The point estimates strongly support the hypothesis that company size a®ects
the importance of having larger patent portfolios. For a small domestic listed company
with the mean portfolio size (1,420 patents), the marginal e®ect of portfolio size on
the probability of litigation is about eight times larger than for a large listed company
with the same portfolio (compare marginal e®ects for Portsize and PortDLIST-S). The
marginal e®ect of portfolio size for small listed ¯rms is even greater than that for unlisted
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¯rms. In short, what is important for settlement is that ¯rms either have a portfolio
of intellectual property to trade, or have other dimensions of interaction that promote
\cooperative" behavior.
Additional evidence that the expectation of repeated interaction promotes settle-
ment is provided by the technology concentration variable (C4), de¯ned in Section 3.
If a company operates in concentrated technology areas (i.e., where the top four ¯rms
account for a larger share of patenting), there is a greater chance the company will
be involved in repeated patent disputes with the same ¯rms. This should increase the
likelihood of settlement and thus reduce the probability of litigation. As predicted, the
coe±cient on the technology concentration index is negative and highly signi¯cant, and
the quantitative e®ect on the litigation probability is large. A ten percent increase in the
four-¯rm technology concentration index reduces the probability of a suit by 4.6 percent.
The portfolio size, company size and technology concentration variables capture
the ability to trade and the role of repeated interaction. We also ¯nd that the litigation
probability is in°uenced by the asymmetry in portfolio size between the patent owner
and likely disputants, which we interpret as re°ecting relative threat power of the parties.
The coe±cient on the relative size variable (Relsize) is signi¯cantly negative for infringe-
ment suits, as expected.18 If a patent owner is large relative to typical disputants, the
probability of litigation is lower (settlement is more likely). However, the e®ect is not
very large { a ten percent increase in relative size lowers the litigation probability by
0.5 percent. Interestingly, relative size does not matter in declaratory judgment suits,
those where the patent owner is the defendant (Panel B). The prediction was that larger
relative size (of the patentee) would make settlement more di±cult or have no e®ect for
declaratory judgement suits, and we ¯nd the latter.
We easily reject the hypothesis that there are no ownership di®erences, when we
control for other factors (Â2(6) = 978:8; p-value <0.001). The pattern of marginal ef-
fects on the ownership dummies points to ¯ve main ¯ndings about the conditional e®ects
of ownership type on the propensity to litigate. First, foreign individuals and unlisted
(smaller) companies are much less likely to engage in infringement suits than their do-
mestic counterparts. Comparing the marginal e®ects of FIND and DIND, we see that
the probability of litigation is much lower { by about 1.2 percentage points { for foreign
18Two points should be noted. For patents without any forward citations, the denominator in the
RelSize variable is set equal to the average portfolio size for other patents in the same 2-digit USPC
class as the patent in question. For all individuals, and for about 900 cases where company patentees
had only one patent, we set RelSize equal to zero.
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individual owners than for their domestic counterparts. Comparing foreign and domestic
unlisted companies (FUNLIST and DUNLIST ), the di®erence is even larger, about
2.0 percentage points. Second, larger domestic and foreign listed companies are equally
likely to ¯le suits. Third, domestic individuals, unlisted and small listed companies are
equally likely to litigate (the di®erences in point estimates are not statistically signi¯-
cant). Fourth, domestic individuals and unlisted companies are more likely { by about
0.9 percentage points { to litigate than large domestic listed ¯rms. And ¯nally, small
listed companies are far more likely to ¯le suits than larger ones, the di®erence being
about 1.0 percentage points on average.
To summarise, we ¯nd the following ranking of the propensity to litigate, where
DLISTS and DLISTB are small and large (or unclassi¯ed) listed, domestic ¯rms,
respectively: DLISTS = DUNLIST = DIND > DLISTB = FLIST > FIND =
FUNLIST . Since these e®ects are conditional on portfolio and company size (both
of which relate to the cost of settling), this ranking should re°ect two main factors:
the cost of litigation and access to information about potential infringements. We expect
that the cost of litigating for domestic patentees is less than (or equal to) that for foreign
patentees, and that it is harder for foreign owners to detect infringements in the U.S.
Given the cost of settling disputes, these hypotheses predict that domestic owners should
litigate more often than their foreign counterparts. That is what we ¯nd, except for listed
companies. This exception is not surprising, since foreign ¯rms that are listed, and with
a presence, in the U.S. are less likely to be at much disadvantage in terms of litigation
costs and access to information.
Table 10 highlights the enormous heterogeneity in litigation risk implied by these
estimation results. We calculate the population probability of involvement in an in-
fringment suit for each patent in the matched sample, given the patent's full set of
characteristics. The 50th-99th percentile cuto®s for the distribution of these probabil-
ities is given in the ¯rst row of the table. The probability of litigation for the median
patent is just under one percent. However, among the top one percent of patents (99th
percentile), the probability of involvement in a suit is over eight percent. The table
shows that the rates can be far higher when the patents are segregated into di®erent
technology and ownership groups. The top percentile of patents in areas that are most
at risk have probabilities of litigation over 15 percent (see Other Health, Computers
and Biotechnology). Similarly, the top one percent of all patents held by domestic un-
listed ¯rms or individuals have a litigation risk over 10 percent. Since most evidence,
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from patent renewal data and ¯rm surveys, indicates that private value of innovations
is highly skewed { with most value attributable to the top patents { it is precisely the
litigation risk in these top percentiles that is relevant for determining incentives.
We now turn to the econometric analysis of post-suit outcomes. In estimating
these regressions, we do not control for selection { i.e., we do not use a (¯ling) selection
equation together with the outcomes equation. Selection bias arises if there is signi¯cant
covariance between the disturbances in the ¯ling and outcome equations. We ask: given
the selection that occurs at ¯ling, is there any remaining association between patent and
patentee characteristics and the outcomes? For purposes of assessing ex ante litigation
risk (e.g., for patenting decisions or insurance pricing), this is the relevant question.
Controlling for selection in the analysis of outcomes (e.g., Somaya, 2001) is appropriate
if one wanted to infer the e®ects of characteristics in a random sample at the outcomes
stage. In any event, the evidence that there is any sample selection bias is mixed (Somaya
2001).
The non-parametric evidence presented in the previous section indicated that the
main characteristics of patents and their owners do not a®ect the probability of set-
tlement after a suit is ¯led, nor the plainti® win rates for cases that reach trial. The
probit regressions for settlement and win rates con¯rm this conclusion. For brevity we
summarise the ¯ndings but do not present the parameter estimates. The settlement
regression has a meager pseudo-R2 of 0.01. The null hypothesis that the regression as a
whole is insigni¯cant is not rejected (Â2(29) = 39.7, p-value= 0.089). The only positive
¯nding is that the coe±cients on three technology ¯eld dummies are signi¯cant and indi-
cate that the settlement probability is about eight percentage points higher for patents
in Electronics, Mechanical and Miscellaneous.19 The probit regression for win rates has
a pseudo-R2 of 0.02. The whole regression is statistically insigni¯cant (Â2(28) = 19.7, p-
value= 0.90), as is each individual coe±cient. Based on our discussions with sta® at the
Federal Judicial Center, there is no reason to believe that the data on settlements and
plainti® win rates are systematically bad (these outcome data are recorded at di®erent
times and in many di®erent courts). We are con¯dent that the \insigni¯cance" of these
19It is also interesting to note that, if we restrict attention to suits where the original patentee is
identi¯ed as the plainti®, then those suits involving smaller patentees (unlisted ¯rms and domestic
individuals) are signi¯cantly less likely to settle. These are patentees who do not have an exclusive
licensee or late assignee litigating in their place. As plainti®s they are more likely to be inexperienced
and more attached to their innovations than owners who have licensed or sold out. Both characteristics
could impede settlement.
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regressions is meaningful: i.e., settlement and win rate outcomes are almost completely
independent of observed characteristics of patents and their owners.
The probability that the settlement of infringement suits occurs early (before the
pre-trial hearing) is also unrelated to most characteristics of the patent and its owner,
with three noteworthy exceptions (the probit regression is signi¯cant: Â2(29) = 50.5,
p-value= 0.008). First, early settlement is more likely if the patent in dispute is part of
a larger portfolio (Portsize). A one standard deviation increase in portfolio size (1,300
patents) raises the probability of early settlement by about 12.9 percent. This is consis-
tent with our earlier result that portfolio size makes ¯ling a suit less likely in the ¯rst
place, due to greater ability to \trade" intellectual property. Second, a higher tech-
nology concentration index (C4) makes early settlement somewhat less likely. A one
standard deviation increase (doubling) in the concentration index lowers the probability
by about two percent. Finally, patent owners that are large relative to a representative
disputant (Relsize) are also less likely to settle early. A one standard deviation rise in
relative size reduces the probability of early settlement by about ¯ve percent.20 Recall
that the probability that a suit is ¯led is lower when the relative size of the patentee is
larger, which we interpret as re°ecting greater threat power. But if the (implicit) threats
do not succeed in preventing the need to ¯le suit, it is important for the patentee to carry
out those threats in order to maintain credibility (post-suit \toughness"). Similarly, it
the discipline of repeated interaction has failed to keep ¯rms in a concentrated area out
of court in the ¯rst place, the dispute is probably very intractable. Both could delay
any post-suit settlement, and this is what we ¯nd.
6 Concluding Remarks
We study the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits,
and their outcomes, by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent o±ce to data
from the U.S. federal court system, the Derwent database and industry sources. This
allows us to construct a suitable controlled random sample of the population of potential
disputants. The data set we construct is the most comprehensive yet available, covering
all patent suits in the U.S. reported by the federal courts during the period 1978-1999.
A major ¯nding in the paper is that all of the sorting among patent disputes on
20Marginal changes are given in terms of standard deviations here because the distribution of these
variables is very skewed after the selection for ¯ling.
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observable characteristics occurs in the decision to ¯le suits. The key post-suit outcomes
{ the probability of settlement and plainti® win rates at trial { do not depend on these
characteristics. From a policy perspective, this is good news because it means that
enforcement of patent rights relies on the e®ective threat of court action (suits) more
than on extensive post-suit, legal proceedings that consume court resources. This feature
is reinforced by high post-suit settlement rates and the fact that most settlement occurs
soon after the suit is ¯led, often before the pre-trial hearing is held. These ¯ndings mean
that the enforcement of patent rights minimises the use of judicial resources for sorting
out patent disputes. The bad news is that individuals and small companies are much
more likely to be involved in suits, conditional on the characteristics of their patent, but
they are no more likely to resolve disputes quickly in post-suit settlements. We provide
clear evidence that what is important for settlement is that ¯rms either have a portfolio
of intellectual property to trade, or have other dimensions of interaction that promote
\cooperative" behavior. In this sense, small ¯rms are at some disadvantage in the their
attempts to protect their intellectual property. But the fact that the heterogeneity in
litigation risk is measurable o®ers the prospect of developing a market for e®ective, and
a®ordable, patent litigation insurance.
An important direction for future research is to explore the dynamic aspects of
con°ict between ¯rms over intellectual property assets. This would include studying the
determinants of the ¯ling and outcomes of multiple (sequential) suits on the same patent
with di®erent parties, and multiple suits on di®erent patents involving the same parties.
Initial work along these lines for a sample of cases is found in Somaya (2001). Proceeding
further requires matching the names of litigants across all cases, a project underway.
When completed these data will provide information about the role of reputation building
in the area of patent enforcement and allow a more detailed assessment of litigation risk
and its associated costs. Even without this information, however, the ¯ndings in this
paper can and should be exploited to develop economically rational pricing of litigation
risk in insurance markets, and theoretical work may be useful in understanding how
e®ective litigation insurance markets are likely to a®ect strategic interaction and R&D
incentives among di®erent ¯rms.
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Appendix 1. Reporting and Truncation Rates for Case Filings
(percent)
Cohort Reporting Lag Truncation
1978 15.9 1 97.6
1979 25.0 2 91.3
1980 26.6 3 82.4
1981 30.2 4 75.3
1982 29.4 5 67.8
1983 33.9 6 60.2
1984 36.8 7 52.8
1985 33.7 8 44.9
1986 38.7 9 37.7
1987 43.0 10 30.0
1988 48.5 11 23.7
1989 49.5 12 18.1
1990 61.2 13 12.5
1991 60.0 14 7.2
1992 57.6 15 3.7
1993 50.0 16 1.2
1994 54.4 17 0.2
1995 53.6 18 0.0
1996 55.2
Notes: The reporting rate is computed as the number of cases reported in Derwent
divided by the number in the Federal Judicial Center data. The truncation rate is
computed from the lag structure of ¯lings for cohorts 1982-1986. The reporting rate for
1996 is used for 1997-1999, as data are not available.
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Appendix 2. Computing Population Filing Probabilities and their
Variance
Let Lz;g, Mz;g and Nz;g denote, respectively, the number of patents in the litigated
and matched samples and in the population that are in portfolios of size z and from
group g, where the latter is de¯ned by technology ¯eld, cohort, and ownership type. The
observed ¯ling probabilities in the sample are Lz;g=(Lz;g+Mz;g): The ¯ling probabilities in
the population are qz;g =
Lz;g
Nz;g
. We cannot calculate these directly as Nz;g is unobserved.
However, since the matched sample is random with respect to portfolio size, we can use
the sample share of the patents in group g that are in portfolios of size z, csz;g = Mz;gMg , as
an unbiased estimator of the population share Nz;g
Ng
: Using this, our estimator is:
cqz;g = Lz;g
Ng
1csz;g :
Now, treating the population itself as a sample from an underlying distribution,
Lz;g
Ng
will also be an estimate of an underlying probability, say p, with an associated
sampling variance. Taking a Taylor expansion, we can capture both sources of error in
the following approximation:
V ar(cqz;g) ´ V ar(bp 1csz;g ) ¼
"
¡bpcsz;g2
#2 csz;g(1¡ csz;g)
Mg
+
·
1csz;g
¸2 bp(1¡ bp)
Ng
where the covariance terms are zero because the two sources of sampling error are inde-
pendent. This simpli¯es to:
V ar(cqz;g) ¼ cqz;g2 ·(1¡ csz;g)
mz;g
¸
+
cqz;g
Ng
·
1csz;g ¡ cqz;g
¸
:
Filing probabilities at a more aggregated level are calculated as a weighted average
of these rates, with weights based on Mg:
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Appendix 3. Deriving Population Litigation Probabilities and Marginal
E®ects
Population Litigation Probabilities
We de¯ne classes by using characteristics with respect to which the sampling was
non-random: USPC groups, cohort, infringement suits, and declaratory judgement suits.
Let P (Xc) denote the population probability of litigation for a patent in class c with
a vector of other characteristics Xc and let Q(Xc) be the corresponding probability
in the pooled (litigated and matched) sample. P (Xc) and Q(Xc) di®er because the
matched sample was constructed so that the overall litigation probability is ¯fty percent,
controlling for technology and cohort. We want to infer P (Xc) from the estimated value
of Q(Xc):
First we determine the extent to which we must in°ate the matched sample for
a given class to have it re°ect the number of unlitigated patents in that class in the
population. Let Q and P represent the aggregate sample and population litigation
probabilities for a given class:
Q = L=(L+M)
where L and M denote the number of litigated and matched patents in the sample. The
population probability is
P = L=N
The number of litigated patents is the same in both cases since the sample contains all
(reported) litigated patents, and N is the number of unlitigated patents in the class in
the population. Using these equations, we get
N = fQ=(1¡Q)PgM ´ KM
Within a class, the matched patents are random draws so the distribution of character-
istics in the matched sample is the same as the population. Thus the expected number
of matched patents with characteristics Xc in the population, N(Xc), is greater than in
the sample by the in°ation factor, K, and so equals KM(Xc). Letting L(Xc) be the
number of litigated patents with characteristics Xc, the expected population probability
of litigation for such patents is
P (Xc) = L(Xc)=[KM(Xc)]:
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Similarly, Q(Xc) = L(Xc)=[L(Xc) +M(Xc)]. Solving for M and substituting we get the
result:
P (Xc) = Q(Xc)=[K(1¡Q(Xc))] (A.3.1)
Population Marginal E®ects
For each characteristic Xk, the population marginal e®ect is
@P (Xc)=@Xkc = [dP (Xc)=dQ(Xc)]@Q(Xc)=@Xkc
The last term is the sample marginal e®ect computed from the probit regression. From
the expression for P (Xc) we get
dP (Xc)=dQ(Xc) = 1=K[1¡Q(Xc)]2
Measuring Q(Xc) by the sample probability of litigation in the class, Q, we get the result:
dP (Xc)=dQ(Xc) ' P=Q(1¡Q):
We measure P for each class as follows: For the denominator, we take the total
number of patents in the class during 1978-1995. In the numerator we use the number of
infringement or declaratory judgement suits that can be directly identi¯ed as such and
include all others as infringement suits. These are in°ated for underreporting and for
truncation as described in Appendix 1. We then calculate marginal adjustment factors by
USPC groups, infringement and declaratory judgement suits. Separate classes de¯ned
by cohort are not needed because of the maintained hypothesis that the litigation model
applies to all cohorts, making non-systematic sampling in this dimension unimportant.
Results are at the bottom of Table 9. Because dP (Xc)=dQ(Xc) is the same for all Xk
for a given class c; all sample marginal e®ects are adjusted by the same factor to convert
them to population marginals.
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Table 1. Composition of Sample: All Filed Cases, Cohorts 1978-95
Technology Number Percent
Drugs 573 5.6
Other Health 825 8.0
Chemical 1,378 13.4
Electronics 1,924 18.7
Mechanical 2,848 27.7
Computers 183 1.8
Biotechnology 92 0.9
Miscellaneous 2,456 23.9
TOTAL 10,279 100.0
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Table 2. Filing Rates, by Technology Field and Cohort Groups
Filing Rate (cases per thousand)
Total: 1978-95 1978-84 1985-90 1991-95
Technology Field
Aggregate 19.0 19.3 16.6 21.1
(0.21) (0.31) (0.28) (0.44)
Drugs 22.2 22.5 18.9 24.3
(1.05) (1.62) (1.34) (1.97)
Other Health 34.6 48.2 35.2 27.3
(1.33) (2.67) (1.98) (2.23)
Chemicals 11.8 11.6 10.9 13.0
(0.35) (0.50) (0.49) (0.80)
Electronics 15.4 16.2 13.1 16.8
(0.40) (0.61) (0.51) (0.79)
Mechanical 16.9 17.7 14.5 18.7
(0.2) (0.53) (0.46) (0.79)
Computers 25.6 32.6 21.2 25.9
(2.25) (4.24) (2.80) (3.78)
Biotechnology 27.9 33.3 27.6 25.5
(3.36) (6.13) (5.16) (5.52)
Miscellaneous 34.2 32.4 28.9 40.7
(0.76) (1.10) (0.98) (1.66)
Notes: The ¯ling rates cover all patent suits ¯led through 1999, including multiple
suits on the same patent. Figures are adjusted both for under-reporting and for trun-
cation (based on the ¯ling rate structure for cohorts 1982-1986). Numbers in bold are
statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3. Mean Citations and Claims per Patent, by Ownership Type
Domestic Listed Domestic Unlisted
Mean Filed Cases Matched Filed Cases Matched
Claims 18.8 13.1 18.6 14.0
(0.60) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23)
Forward cites/claim 2.17 0.98 1.25 0.85
(0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Backward cites/claim 1.00 1.18 1.11 1.20
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Foreign Firms Individuals
Mean Filed Cases Matched Filed Cases Matched
Claims 14.5 10.6 14.2 11.0
(0.38) (0.13) (0.19) (0.17)
Forward cites/claim 1.58 0.76 1.57 0.84
(0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Backward cites/claim 0.95 0.99 1.09 1.34
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Notes: Citations include self-cites. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
Numbers in bold are statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4. Filing and Settlement Rates, by Ownership Type
Individuals Dom. Unlisted Dom Listed Foreign Firms
Filing Rate 35.2 46.0 10.4 4.2
(cases/thousand) (0.65) (0.78) (0.27) (0.16)
Settlement Rate 94.7 94.0 94.1 94.5
(percent) (1.4) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9)
Notes: Foreign ¯rms include both listed and unlisted companies. The ¯ling rate
is the number of suits ¯led per thousand patents, including multiple suits on the same
patent, from cohorts 1978-1995 (as in Table 2). The settlement rate is the fraction of
¯led cases that are reported to have been settled at some time prior to court judgement,
according to the FJC. Settlement rates are computed for suits ¯led during the period
1978-1992 to minimize truncation bias and include only infringement suits. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses. Numbers in bold are statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 5. Probability of Litigation and Settlement, by Patent Portfolio Size
Prob. of Litigation Settlement Rate
Portfolio Size (percent) (percent)
0-10 1.71 (0.05) 95.0 (0.5)
11-100 1.20 (0.05) 93.3 (0.7)
101-200 0.52 (0.05) 93.0 (1.7)
201-300 0.43 (0.06) 97.0 (1.3)
301-600 0.39 (0.04) 90.9 (1.9)
601-900 0.34 (0.04) 93.3 (2.5)
>900 0.26 (0.01) 93.2 (1.1)
Notes: The probability of litigation is adjusted for underreporting and truncation
and for the over-representation of patents from large portfolios (Appendix 2). See also
notes to Table 4.
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Table 6. Probability of Litigation and Settlement,
by Patent Portfolio Size and Ownership Type
Panel A. Probability of Litigation (percent)
Large Dom.Listed Small Dom. Listed Dom.Unlisted Foreign Firms
Portfolio
0-10 0.55 (.26) 1.09 (.49) 2.63 (.09) 0.48 (.03)
11-100 1.16 (.25) 1.78 (.32) 2.00 (.09) 0.37 (.03)
101-200 0.70 (.14) 0.77 (.28) 0.67 (.12) 0.23 (.03)
201-300 0.49 (.17) 0.82 (.32) 0.84 (.27) 0.18 (.04)
301-600 0.54 (.10) 0.70 (.31) 0.56 (.10) 0.19 (.03)
601-900 0.62 (.10) 0.44 (.25) 0.34 (.12) 0.18 (.04)
>900 0.39 (.02) nc 0.37 (.06) 0.12 (.01)
Panel B. Settlement Rates (percent)
Dom. Listed Dom.Unlisted Foreign Firms
Portfolio
0-10 90.0 (3.1) 95.0 (0.5) 95.9 (1.3)
11-100 95.0 (1.3) 93.0 (0.9) 91.2 (2.3)
101-200 92.9 (2.4) 92.1 (3.4) 95.0 (3.4)
201-300 98.8 (1.2) 97.9 (2.1) 90.3 (5.3)
301-600 92.0 (2.4) 85.2 (3.9) 100.0 (0.0)
601-900 96.3 (2.6) 87.5 (5.8) 94.4 (5.4)
>900 94.1 (1.3) 88.8 (3.0) 95.3 (2.6)
Notes: The probability of litigation is the number of patents involved in suits
(multiple suits not counted) per hundred patents, adjusted for underreporting and trun-
cation and for the over-representation of patents from large portfolios (Appendix 2). 'nc'
denotes an empty cell. See also notes to Table 4.
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Table 7. Probability of Litigation, by Technology and Firm Ownership
(in percent)
Dom. Unlisted Small Dom. Listed Large Dom. Listed Foreign
Technology
Drugs 9.1 (0.2) 2.9 (0.2) 4.2 (0.2) 3.3 (0.1)
Other Health 10.5 (0.2) 9.1 (0.4) 4.1 (0.3) 2.2 (0.1)
Chemicals 3.8 (0.1) 3.9 (0.1) 1.2 (0.05) 0.5 (0.02)
Electronics 6.6 (0.1) 12.3 (0.1) 11.2 (0.1) 0.8 (0.02)
Mechanical 6.8 (0.1) 3.9 (0.1) 11.2 (0.1) 0.7 (0.02)
Computers 14.9 (0.6) nc 1.3 (0.2) 0.3 (0.06)
Biotechnology 20.1 (0.7) 3.9 (0.6) 3.4 (0.6) 7.2 (0.5)
Miscellaneous 11.2 (0.2) 4.2 (0.1) 2.6 (0.1) 1.3 (0.04)
Notes: See notes to Table 5.
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Table 8. Timing of Settlements and Trial Win Rates, by Ownership Type
Dom. Listed Dom. Unlisted Foreign Firms Individuals
Timing of settlement (%):
Before pre-trial hearing 81.2 83.0 78.8 84.7
(1.2) (0.7) (1.7) (0.8)
Before trial 18.0 15.5 19.9 14.2
(1.2) (0.7) (1.7) (1.8)
During trial 0.8 1.5 1.3 1.1
(0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (1.9)
Plainti® Win Rate at Trial 51.2 49.1 42.7 46.5
(3.8) (2.3) (4.9) (2.3)
Notes: The timing of settlements is computed on the basis of all infringement cases
¯led during the period 1978-1992 and terminated by settlement before or during trial,
according to the FJC. Cases that proceed beyond trial (e.g., on appeal or remand, which
are about 5%) are not included. The plainti® win rate is the number of infringement
cases where the court judgement favors the patentee divided by the total number of cases.
When the FJC reports a judgement in favor of both parties, we treat it as a win for each
party and adjust the total appropriately. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are
based on the binomial formula. Numbers in bold are statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01
level.
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Table 9. Probit Estimation of Litigation Probability: Case ¯ling
Panel A Panel B
Infringements Declaratory Judgements
Variable Parameter Marginal Parameter Marginal
Claims 0.023 0.007 0.029 0.002
(.001) (.003)
Claims2 (x 103) -0.024 -0.15
(.002) (.038)
FWD cites/claim 0.19 0.059 0.20 0.008
(.008) (.017)
[FWD cites/claim]2 x103 -4.38 -5.65
(.32) (.83)
BWD cites/claim -0.056 -0.017 -0.072 -0.005
(.010) (.019)
[BWD cites/claim]2 x 103 0.89 1.47
(.43) (.62)
FWDSELF 0.51 0.17 0.63 0.05
(.058) (.10)
BWDSELF -0.31 -0.10 -0.16 -0.01
(.08) (.15)
NO3USPC -0.068 -0.022 -0.014 -0.003
(.008) (.015)
Portsize (x 103) -0.104 -0.025 -0.21 -0.015
(.037) (.13)
Portsize2 (x 106) 0.009 0.005
(.001) (.003)
PortNondrug (x 103) -0.061 -0.021 0.056 0.004
(.033) (.12)
PortUNLIST (x 103) -0.027 -0.009 -0.07 -0.005
(.013) (.04)
PortFLIST (x 103) 0.001 0.0003 0.05 0.004
(.020) (.05)
PortDLIST-S (x 103) -0.60 -0.20 -0.36 0.028
(.27) (.41)
Tech. Concentration (C4) -4.17 -1.36 -6.15 -0.48
(.23) (.46)
Relsize (x 103) -3.10 -1.01 -0.91 -0.07
(1.12) (2.67)
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Infringements Declaratory Judgements
Variable Parameter Marginal Parameter Marginal
FIND -0.54 -0.12 -1.84 -0.036
(.09) (.17)
DIND 0.13 0.14 -1.30 0.012
(.08) (.15)
FUNLIST -0.69 -0.22 -1.81 -0.045
(.08) (.15)
DUNLIST 0.21 0.19 -1.06 0.058
(.08) (.15)
FLIST -0.15 0.007 -1.77 -0.030
(.19) (.42)
DLIST-S 0.27 0.17 0.46 0.060
(.11) (.15)
DLIST-B -0.23 -0.03 -0.98 -0.006
(.08) (.20)
No. observations 17,443 11,061
Pseudo-R2 0.162 0.164
Â2(31) 3858.3 1098.9
Conversion Factors to Estimate Population Marginal E®ects
Technology Field Infringements Declaratory Judgements
Aggregate .048 .021
Drugs .050 .018
Other Health .089 .039
Chemicals .031 .014
Electronics .038 .020
Mechanical .045 .021
Computers .063 .034
Biotechnology .076 .030
Miscellaneous .084 .031
Notes: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Numbers in bold are signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. The conversion factors are computed as described in Appendix
3.
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Table 10. Predicted Probabilities of Infringement Suits
Percentile of Distribution 99th 95th 90th 50th
Aggregate 7.9 % 3.8 % 2.8 % 0.8 %
Technology Field
Drugs 9.4 % 3.9 % 2.8 % 0.9 %
Other Health 19.5 6.1 4.5 1.7
Chemicals 4.2 2.1 1.6 0.5
Electronics 7.1 2.8 2.1 0.5
Mechanical 6.5 2.8 2.2 0.7
Computers 14.8 4.5 3.4 0.6
Biotechnology 12.9 6.3 5.3 1.3
Miscellaneous 8.3 4.6 3.7 1.9
Ownership Type
Domestic Individual 9.4 % 4.4 % 3.5 % 1.9 %
Domestic Unlisted 13.7 5.9 4.2 1.9
Small Domestic Listed 6.3 5.4 4.1 1.8
Large Domestic Listed 4.8 2.0 1.5 0.5
Foreign Listed 2.5 1.4 1.0 0.3
Foreign Individual 4.2 1.4 1.1 0.6
Foreign Unlisted 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.3
Notes: The distribution of population probabilities for patents with di®erent char-
acteristics is calculated by ¯rst computing the sample probabilities using the parameter
estimates for infringement suits in Table 9. These are then adjusted to re°ect population
probabilities using Appendix equation (A.3.1).
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